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INTRODUCTION 
Advocates of membership argued the European single currency could unleash 
economic potential that would increase economic growth and investment, achieve 
low and stable inflation and build a strong European economy through: 
encouraging greater trade; reducing transaction costs; increasing price 
transparency. In terms of new institutions, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
through ensuring price stability results in lower inflation and interest rates, 
thereby again boosting investment and economic growth. Additionally, the euro 
would establish itself as a major world currency conferring economic advantages 
and political prestige based upon the EU’s combined economic strength. Finally, 
arguments that eurozone membership reduces national sovereignty were rejected 
on the grounds that sovereignty is not absolute any more, due to the globalisation 
of financial markets and voluntary limitations imposed by international treaties 
(Baimbridge et al., 2000). However, many critics argued that the costs of entry 
were in fact potentially far larger, where the loss of monetary and the exchange 
rate policy weaken national economic management, which is further constrained 
by the restraints upon fiscal policy. Further, the lack of prior cyclical and 
structural convergence created strains such that unsynchronised business cycles 
and/or structural differences magnify the effects of asymmetric external shocks. 
This is potentially further exacerbated by the absence of any substantial fiscal 
redistribution mechanism to offset less competitive areas suffering declining 
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incomes and persistent unemployment. Additionally, a unified monetary policy 
would be unable to meet the needs of all economies through concentrating upon 
the ‘average’ member state. In terms of rules and institutions, the ‘generous’ 
interpretation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) convergence criteria 
implied that the majority of participants must continue to deflate their economies 
in order to meet the rigid financial criteria established by the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). Finally, the ECB is fundamentally undemocratic because it is 
deliberately insulated from all political influence (Baimbridge et al., 2000). 
 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the combination of tight fiscal 
policy, mandated by the SGP, and the conservatism of the ECB has already 
resulted in the eurozone economy suffering a decade or more of slow growth. 
Since the inception of the euro many commentators have argued that, despite its 
resilience to immediate collapse due to the volume of political, and from 2010 
financial, capital invested in it by the EU establishment, it remains a 
fundamentally flawed creation (Minford, 2002; Baimbridge and Whyman, 2008). 
Therefore, the eurozone constitutes a ‘leap in the dark’ with potentially 
destructive implications if its participants are insufficiently cyclically and 
structurally convergent (Eichengreen, 1990, 1992, 1993). The reasons are varied: 
the eurozone fails to fulfil, or even approach, the optimum convergence criteria 
agreed by economists to be the minimum requirement for the efficient operation 
of a monetary union; crucially it lacks an adjustment mechanism to meet 
inevitably changing economic circumstances, both internal and external, other 
than price and income deflation; its governing institutions, the ECB and the 
European Commission, are not subject to democratic accountability, let alone 
control; it was adopted for essentially non-economic motives as the next stage of 
an integrationist European project, but without the necessary political 
coordination to underpin it. 
 
THE EUROZONE AS A FLAWED MONETARY UNION 
In addition to these longstanding potential problems inherent with the creation 
of the eurozone, its design in terms of risks emanating from spill-over and free-
rider effects resulting from a lack of fiscal discipline has been relentlessly exposed 
following the 2008 credit crunch induced recession. Whilst theoretically fiscal 
policy should be used as a countercyclical tool, governments may also use the 
policy for purely political reasons; however, if this is the case, fiscal policy may 
become challenging within a monetary union such as the eurozone through the 
occurrence of spill-over or free-rider effects (von Hagen and Wyplosz, 2008). The 
former may occur if eurozone members run large budget deficits over a prolonged 
period of time leading to their fiscal stance being on an unsustainable path, which 
given its financing through the financial markets, results in ever high interest rates 
on sovereign debt. Additionally, with such growing recourse to the financial 
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market, the availability of finance may decrease and therefore further drive-up 
interest rates. Thus, one member’s debt issue spills-over to others as financing 
sovereign debt becomes more expensive for all countries (Arezki et al., 2011). 
The potential hazard of free-rider effects materialises when a country cannot meet 
the repayment of its outstanding debt, with default on the horizon, it can either 
undertake surprise devaluation or inflation to reduce its debt’s real value. 
However, for eurozone members without sovereign monetary policy, these 
methods are no longer available, thereby increasing the possibility of outright 
default (McKinnon, 1996). Moreover, with the integration of financial markets, 
one country’s bonds may be widely held by other members. Thus, outright debt 
default harms not only domestic bond holders, but other government and private 
investors holding such bonds. Consequently, the pressure to bail-out troubled 
fellow members may increase, and, without restrictions on fiscal behaviour, a 
member country may allow its debt to increase continuously if they believe other 
governments will bail it out. Under a currency union, member countries lose not 
only their monetary independence, but also a central bank to back their sovereign 
debts; thus, eurozone governments become uniquely vulnerable to self-fulfilling 
panic over default. Additionally, the connection between the operation of the euro 
and the recent worldwide economic recession provides an illustration that national 
self-governance offers the potential for superior economic performance. 
 
Table 1 Mean GDP growth rates (%) 
 
 
1993-1998 1999-2007 2008-2011 
Eurozone 1.85 2.26 -0.11 
European Union 2.17 2.54 -0.08 
USA 3.70 2.85 0.21 
OECD 2.62 2.56 0.19 
World 2.89 3.26 1.55 
 
 
To review the economic performance across the economies of the EU with 
particular reference to recent events, Tables.1 and 2 present an overview of mean 
GDP growth and unemployment rates for several key time periods: from the 
completion of the Single Internal Market to the fixing of exchange rates for 
eurozone countries (1993-1998), the operation of the eurozone prior to the Great 
Recession (1999-2007) and of the Great Recession itself (2008-2011). For 
comparative purposes the information is shown for a number of economic regions 
in addition to the eurozone itself. It is noticeable how relatively poorly the 
eurozone has performed with the slowest GDP growth and highest unemployment 
rate across all periods. Such stylised facts lend support to the hypotheses that the 
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eurozone is far from optimal through having failed to provide the ‘safety in 
numbers’ to weather shocks. 
 
Table 2 Mean unemployment rate (%) 
 
 1993-1998 1999-2007 2008-2011 
Eurozone 11.26 8.77 9.25 
European Union 10.65 8.71 8.74 
USA 5.57 4.94 8.40 
OECD 7.32 6.45 7.59 
World 5.30 5.83 5.86 
 
 
A further problematic symptom the financial crisis has highlighted within the 
eurozone is the balance of payments (BoP) difficulties that some members have 
experienced, together with the divergence of external balances between members. 
In relation to the rest of the world (RoW), then countries in the North (e.g. 
Germany, Netherlands and Austria) have persistently experienced current account 
surplus’, whilst those in the South/Periphery (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain) have experienced persistent current account deficits despite an 
approximately balanced overall position (Holinski, et al., 2012). Although 
originally perceived to be irrelevant, with the focus being on the global balance of 
the eurozone, these divergences are now partially identified as sources of the 
eurozone crisis (Sawyer, 2012). It is therefore pertinent to review the policy 
options for individual eurozone members to correct such BoP disequilibria and 
evaluate their desirability. 
 
Initially, following the advent of Keynesian demand management, policy 
prescriptions were advocated to resolve external imbalances and aid adjustment 
mechanisms (Crockett, 1982); however, several policies are unavailable to 
individual eurozone members. For example, notwithstanding their criticisms, 
short-term expenditure switching policies/elasticities approach that advocates 
changes in relative price levels between countries through either 
appreciations/revaluations or depreciations/devaluations (Södersten and Reed, 
1994; Pilbeam, 2006). However, despite the unavailability of such policies, 
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) argue that eurozone countries could mimic this 
in the short-term through ‘internal devaluation’ to restore competitiveness by 
decreasing labour costs and hence relative price levels. Policy options include 
decreased social security payments, reducing indexation of wage increases, or 
through minimising minimum wage growth. For example, if Greece and Portugal 
moderated minimum wage increases to those experienced by Northern eurozone 
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members, this would improve current account balances by 2-2.5 percentage points 
(Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon, 2010). Indeed, such measures are essentially those 
imposed upon bailout economies that have proved politically and socially 
problematic; however, it should be noted that if all Southern eurozone members 
adopt such policies there will be little gained in relative competitiveness 
(Duwicquet, et al., 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the use of direct controls (e.g. tariffs, quotas and embargoes) are 
also excluded policy options; whereby trade policies are negotiated on behalf of 
all EU members, thus individual nations are unable to apply direct controls 
against the RoW (Lea, 2010). Additionally, longer-term policy options that 
emphasise BoP imbalances as entirely monetary phenomena are also unfeasible 
(Williamson and Milner, 1991); since eurozone members cannot control their 
narrow money supply, together with the prohibition of capital controls, then they 
possess no control over credit creation (Arestis and Sawyer, 2012). Therefore, 
members must either control their growth rate to prevent inflation, or face losing 
international competitiveness (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994). Consequently, 
there are only a limited number of policy options available to individual eurozone 
members. In the short-term, the traditional approach emphasises the use of 
changes in the level of domestic spending, or absorption (Pilbeam, 2006). For 
example, in current account surplus countries, such as Germany, the policy 
prescription would be expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate the economy and 
increase imports to resolve the imbalance (Jirankova and Hnat, 2012). However, 
such policies may conflict with internal balance; for example, Germany has 
typically operated at full employment output, such that any expansionary fiscal 
policy to increase absorption would create inflation (Arestis and Sawyer, 2012). 
Furthermore, since fiscal policy is limited due to the SGP, the burden of 
adjustment is asymmetrically imposed on deficit countries (Ahearne, et al., 2007). 
Similarly in BoP deficit countries, contractionary fiscal policy is required; 
however, domestically these countries are experiencing low growth and high 
levels of unemployment (Chen, et al., 2012); thus such policies create a trade-off 
between internal and external balance, whereby there is a sacrifice of domestic 
goals (Thirlwall and Gibson, 1992). Hence, obtaining simultaneous internal and 
external equilibrium using only one policy is problematic; Tinbergen (1952) 
seminally proposed that the number of targets require at least an equal numbers of 
instruments, whilst Mundell (1968) advocated that policies should be assigned 
based on their relative effectiveness. Arguably fiscal policy has greater effects on 
the domestic economy, whilst monetary policy through interest rate differentials 
attracts capital flows and is therefore more effectively assigned to the BoP 
(Pilbeam, 2006). However, for eurozone countries monetary policy is controlled 
at the ECB supranational level, such that national governments are residually left 
with fiscal policy to attain simultaneous equilibrium (Holinski, et al., 2012); 
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therefore, the adjustment mechanism is more difficult and uncertain (Duwicquet, 
et al., 2012). 
 
These aforementioned weaknesses in the design of the eurozone are 
permanent, but become more damaging in times of crisis. In the wake of the 
worldwide financial recession, the eurozone suffered a series of debt crises in 
individual member states. To date, the eurozone’s response has been piecemeal; 
ad hoc loans have been provided, whilst minor revisions to the Lisbon Treaty 
were agreed to enable the creation of a bail-out fund, the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) to become the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Such ‘solutions’, however, deal with the symptoms rather than the fundamental 
causes of the euro’s structural weaknesses. The latter ensure that recurrent 
problems will emerge that vitiate proposed remedies once they affect a large 
member country. Although the immediate origin of present discontents is usually 
located in the collapse of the American investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in 
September 2008, its European antecedents lay in the bubble of speculative finance 
that occurred in the initial decade of the twenty-first century. This was intensified 
by the requirement to impose uniform interest rates in order to create an artificial 
monetary union amongst nations that did not always meet even their own 
restricted (financial not ‘real’) convergence criteria. Specifically, when the euro 
was introduced, the prevailing interest rate on 2 January 1999 stood at 3.25% for 
the three month Euribar (Euro Interbank Offered Rate), and, to achieve this target, 
nominal rates had fallen significantly in the previous nine years in France, Italy, 
Spain and Germany (O’Connor, 2009). Unsurprisingly massive foreign 
investment ensued, stock markets boomed, whilst house prices and household 
debt levels soared. Inevitably in such a low interest rate environment, investment 
banks and pension funds sought greater rates of return from alternative asset 
classes. Consequently ‘structured products’ developed becoming the norm for 
investment in higher yielding loan assets. 
 
The strength of the euro until 2010 was determined by the competitive power 
of the German economy, which caused deflation in many other eurozone members 
since having the same interest rate for all countries created a ‘boom-bust’ cycle in 
a number of them. Hence, the growth rate across the zone languished, whilst 
unemployment as well as government budget and trade deficits multiplied. 
Additionally, in 2007 the German coalition increased value added tax by 3%, 
which financed concessions to industry so that it could compete at a higher 
exchange rate, but in the process intensified the problems of its eurozone 
‘partners’. Furthermore, the actions of the ECB, as the institution responsible for 
the one size fits all monetary policy in the eurozone, also contributed to the series 
of events contributing to the crisis. Initially, it adopted a low interest rate policy in 
2002-2003, which stimulated financial speculation. However, after 2005 it 
changed strategy so that rates climbed until the autumn 2008 crash. Indeed, it 
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bowed to German pressure in June 2007 and as late as July 2008, raising interest 
rates to curb ‘external inflation’, despite an already tight monetary environment. 
By definition, the ECB operates monetary policy for the eurozone as a whole, 
typically focusing upon the ‘average’ member state, so that policy is often too 
tight for some whilst too loose for other nations. Moreover, it is more difficult for 
the ECB to utilise monetary policy to regulate asset prices, whether stocks or 
housing, in individual nation states, where bubbles may occur. Thus, whilst few 
would claim ECB action to be the sole cause, it would be naïve to dismiss it as 
irrelevant rather than a contributory influence. Although it might be argued that it 
is unfair to criticise the eurozone for struggling to deal with the negative 
consequences of the financial crisis, since it is by no means alone in this respect. 
Indeed, the Anglo-Saxon model was complicit in the loose regulation and 
speculative financial innovation which helped to precipitate the crisis in the first 
place. Nevertheless, the ‘old’ European model could have avoided the worst of 
these failings, through stronger financial sector regulation and a more managed 
economy, but it did not, and the current the eurozone framework was at least a 
contributory factor. 
 
Although this series of events exacerbated the inherent problems regarding 
the functioning of the eurozone, such difficulties could have been tempered if it 
incorporated a coherent adjustment mechanism to meet inevitably changing 
economic circumstances. In a dynamic market economy, characterised by 
technological and organisational progress, change is continuous; what Schumpeter 
(1942) famously termed the ‘gale of creative destruction’. Furthermore, since the 
Industrial Revolution all capitalist economies experienced a cycle of periodic 
booms followed by periodic depressions. Consequently, it is crucial to the health 
of every economy that it possesses a robust adjustment mechanism to enable it to 
accommodate efficiently to the inevitable transformations that will occur in its 
internal and external environment. However, the eurozone lacks this crucial 
element in its structure whilst simultaneously harbouring potentially damaging 
spill-over and free-rider problems. Thus, in the recent recession its members no 
longer possess an independent monetary policy, so that they cannot set interest 
rates or exchange rates to stabilise their economies. The current sovereign debt 
problems faced by several participating nations demonstrate the simultaneous 
dangers of losing control of their borrowing costs and the value of their currency 
to an external agency. Consequently, deflation with all its economic, political and 
social costs has become the eurozone’s sole adjustment mechanism to the 
detriment of its citizens. 
 
Conventional wisdom is that these contemporary crises are the product of 
deficient policy-making in the suffering countries, often expressed in moral terms 
as ‘indiscipline’ (Mills, 2011). In particular, budgetary policy has been too 
expansive and economies are too competitively inflexible. The consequences of 
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such errors are public expenditure cuts, increases in taxation and/or declining real 
wages. Additionally, the conventional wisdom declares that once fiscal 
consolidation has occurred and labour market flexibility introduced, the countries 
concerned can return to non-inflationary growth, as Germany did after 2003. 
However, such conventional wisdom is misplaced, subjecting the eurozone to 
inefficient and ultimately unsustainable tensions. So long as the ECB tolerates 
weak demand in the eurozone as a whole and so long as the EU’s founder 
members (especially Germany) run trade surpluses, it will prove impossible for 
less competitive nations to avoid insolvency. Their problems cannot be resolved 
by fiscal austerity alone, but only by a large rise in the external demand for their 
output. However, in a eurozone without monetary or exchange rate offsets, any 
reduction in public expenditure generates at least an equivalent reduction in 
output. For example, an attempt to cut a fiscal deficit by 10% of GDP through 
falls in spending would involve an actual reduction of 15% in GDP once declining 
tax revenues are taken into account (Holland, 1995). A diminution in purchasing 
power of this magnitude will create a spiral of debt deflation in which the cost of 
meeting unpaid debts leads to low growth, falling prices, loss of jobs and 
declining living standards (Minsky, 2008). This ‘perfect storm’ increases the risk 
of default and therefore is likely to cause long-term interest rates to rise, the very 
thing that the adjustment policy was designed to avoid. Such a scenario carries 
dire consequences for future productive potential, political dislocation and social 
distress (Baimbridge et al., 1994). 
 
Almunia et al. (2010) compared the operation of the interwar Gold Standard 
with that of the euro, arguing that both systems are undermined as much by 
persistent surplus, as by persistent deficit, countries. Indeed, more so because 
those in surplus are under no compulsion to change and are unwilling to 
contemplate this scenario. However, Germany now needs to reconsider its 
position, because the only way for other eurozone countries to lower fiscal deficits 
without their economies collapsing is through a huge net export expansion, based 
upon both improved productivity and crucially buoyant external demand. 
Currently neither is forthcoming, so that it is difficult to regain competitiveness 
when the euro is strong, partly because Germany is so competitive and partly also 
because eurozone inflation is low. Furthermore, the financial markets are correct 
in questioning the willingness of governments, and societies as a whole, to suffer 
the enormous deflationary burden imposed by euro membership. Indeed, the most 
direct method for eurozone nations to avoid the consequent deflationary effects of 
the eurozone is by dismantling or, at the very least, reconstructing its entire mode 
of operation. 
 
Attainment of the TEU convergence criteria 
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Most academic social science literature either accepts that closer EU 
integration is desirable, or more usually, given the political will of EU leaders, 
that it is inevitable. Therefore economists, political scientists and sociologists 
frequently devote their research to the dynamics of EMU, the political institutions 
fostering ‘ever closer union’ and the social implications of these momentous 
changes. However, whilst such detailed analyses generate important policy 
proposals, they tend by their weight to obscure the crucial strategic issue: is EMU 
beneficial or not for the EU as a whole? The purpose of this chapter is to analyse 
this issue. More specifically, it seeks to evaluate the criteria that have been 
advanced by different authorities to assess whether or not membership of the 
single currency would prove beneficial. 
 
Over the last 20 years, economists have studied the potential impact of 
monetary union between countries under the rubric of optimum currency area 
theory. It concludes that a single currency boosts participants’ living standards 
when they possess similar economic structures and international trading patterns, 
but proves detrimental where these diverge. The danger of locking a country’s 
currency within an international regime ill-suited to meeting domestic and 
external economic goals is illustrated by mass unemployment under the Gold 
Standard of the 1920s. Consequently, to avoid making a potentially costly 
mistake, especially since single currency membership is intended to be permanent 
and irrevocable with no exit clause negotiated in the TEU, there is an obvious 
need for a series of measurements to determine whether an individual economy is 
prepared for the demands of membership (EC Commission, 1992). These 
indicators must incontrovertibly demonstrate the existence of prior, sustainable 
‘real’ convergence between participating economies, before the formation of a 
single currency between these countries is in their economic interests. However, 
despite the critical importance of such indicators in establishing whether or not 
membership of EMU is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for a particular country, their construction 
has been paid relatively scant attention. 
 
Indeed, the convergence criteria contained within the TEU are more 
concerned with examining transitory cyclical movements in financial indicators, 
rather than concentrating upon structural convergence in the real economy (EC 
Commission, 1992). Thus the only questions asked are those concerning the levels 
of price inflation, interest rates, exchange rate stability, public debt and annual 
budget deficits. The TEU focused upon ‘nominal’ convergence, measured by 
reference values (e.g. 60% debt; 3% deficit) that largely reflect historical levels of 
debt and deficit in the ‘core’ EU countries. Their relevance to future conditions is 
unclear. In contrast, the TEU contained no similar tests to compare the wealth of 
the different countries, their unemployment, productivity and growth rates, nor the 
sectoral composition of economic activity. Perhaps this is not entirely surprising 
as the EMU project was designed by a committee dominated by central bankers, 
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whose particular concern was to devise rules restraining potentially profligate 
national governments from destabilising the monetary system. However, whilst 
these matters are important, it is problematic that EMU is designed to proceed 
from such a narrow, theoretically questionable foundation. Such concerns are 
magnified by the fact that EMU possesses no historical precedents. No monetary 
union has existed independently of political union and no independent country has 
ever unilaterally abandoned its own currency (Goodhart, 1995). EMU is therefore 
a ‘leap in the dark’ that has potentially destructive implications if its participants 
are not sufficiently converged prior to its establishment (Eichengreen, 1992 and 
1993). 
 
The identification of those individual EU member states that have 
demonstrated their suitability for single currency membership is officially 
determined by their attainment of the five TEU convergence criteria that are 
denominated exclusively in terms of ‘nominal’ rather than ‘real’ convergence 
targets. Nominal values as represented here concentrate upon specific financial 
ratios rather than measurements of productivity and output growth, changes in the 
level of employment and other indicators from the real economy. 
 
The initial two criteria regarding inflation and interest rates have a clear 
rationale with respect to the establishment of a single currency area based upon 
the achievement of prior cyclical convergence. The similarity of inflation rates 
denotes a low probability of a sudden loss of competitiveness inside a single 
currency that might lead to unemployment blackspots and a growing inequality at 
the heart of the monetary union. Moreover, comparable interest rates indicate a 
relatively straightforward transition to a common monetary policy that does not 
require dramatic changes in the national strategies formally pursued by the nation 
states. However, whilst these two convergence criteria are theoretically sound, the 
latter three have generated both analytical and empirical controversy. 
 
The third criteria regarding ‘normal’ ERM fluctuation bands was interpreted 
until 1992 as the relatively narrow margins of +/-2.25% around the central parity. 
However, following the 1992-93 exchange rate crises, the bands were widened to 
+/-15% for an indefinite period in order to reduce the speculative pressure upon 
the ERM, whilst Italy and the UK were forced to withdraw from the system 
entirely. As a result, the third convergence criteria was relaxed in order to adapt to 
this new reality, so that member states only had to achieve the looser measure of 
currency stability required by the ERM (Aglietta and Uctum, 1996). However, the 
re-definition significantly reduced this indicator’s utility, because the looser 
arrangement allowed for a currency to fluctuate by a potential of 30% and still be 
considered stable. During any period other than an economic crisis or massive 
competitive misalignment, it would be unlikely that a currency would threaten to 
breach such a lax target, so that the criteria becomes increasingly difficult to 
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defend.  Indeed, at their June 1996 meeting EU Finance Ministers agreed to 
ignore the ERM membership precondition entirely. The decision was particularly 
fortuitous, since a significant number of countries still failed to meet such modest 
standards. The UK and Sweden have not rejoined the ERM, whilst Spain and 
Ireland realigned their central parity rates; thus they failed to meet the original 
principle of successively reducing exchange rate fluctuations, whilst preventing 
realignments prior to the establishment of a single currency in order to minimise 
adjustment costs. 
 
The inclusion of the final two targets concerning the budget deficit and 
national debt as means to establish the compatibility of potential participants 
within a monetary union raises further problems. The justifications for their use 
are, firstly, that they would result in a stable debt ratio in a steady-state economy 
with 2% inflation and 3% real growth (Trades Union Congress, 1993); and 
secondly, advocacy of the ‘golden-rule’ that current government expenditure and 
revenue should be equated, together with an estimate that EU public investment 
approximately averaged 3% over the period 1974-91, indicates adoption of the 
convergence criteria (Buiter et al., 1993). However, the first justification fails to 
provide a convincing case for the specific values chosen for maximum 
government borrowing as a proportion of GDP, since the fiscal reference values 
are compatible with any combination of inflation and growth which sum to 5% 
per annum.  Moreover, there is no evidence that attainment of these criteria would 
result in a steady-state economy (Arestis and Sawyer, 1996). Consequently the 
justification for the last two convergence criteria is far from secure and the case 
for their reliability must rest upon the second justification. However, it appears to 
be based upon the simplifying and unlikely assumption of zero inflation, 
otherwise inflation accounting must be included into the calculation. The 60% 
national debt criterion is of doubtful use in any case, because it is primarily a 
consequence of the prior accretion of debt, reflecting past fiscal activities rather 
than current policy (Goodhart, 1992). Whilst it is important to avoid a country 
joining a monetary union so over-burdened by the results of poor previous 
macroeconomic management that it is susceptible to current repayment crises, the 
adoption of a 60% maximum figure appears somewhat arbitrary and unnecessarily 
harsh. 
 
Despite the problematic nature of the convergence criteria, the architects of 
EMU believed that their attainment would indicate the compatibility of potential 
participants, together with providing a guide to their subsequent maintenance in 
both favourable and unfavourable economic conditions (Baimbridge, 1997). The 
prerequisite of prior convergence is significant over each stage of the economic 
cycle, if EMU is to prove robust against symmetric and asymmetric shocks 
(Eichengreen, 1992; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993). However, examining the 
extent to which EU member states have actually met the convergence criteria over 
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the period 1992-2002 following the signing of the TEU encapsulates both a 
recession and recovery makes difficult reading for supporters of European 
monetary integration. Only in 1998, the crucial year prior to the irrevocable fixing 
of national exchange rates did compliance with the convergence criteria begin to 
approach that necessary for a sustainable monetary union. Even then, however, 
only six EU member states achieved strict adherence to all five convergence 
criteria. 
 
The attainment of all five criteria was fulfilled on only 29 out of a possible 
165 occasions over the 1992-2002 period. A record of achievement of 
approximately 18% is a particularly poor reflection of the prior convergence of 
the EU economies, as measured by the convergence criteria, particularly 
manifested in the period preceding EMU, when member states retained 
considerable control over their economies. Indeed, only Luxembourg, a country 
atypical of other EU members’ economies in terms of its size, industrial base, and 
the fact that it does not possess its own central bank (allowing Belgium to operate 
its monetary policy) appears able to consistently meet the 5 criteria. Of the 
remaining fourteen EU member states, only seven have ever secured total 
compliance with the convergence indicators with key euro zone countries such as 
Austria, Belgium, Italy and Greece failing to achieve all five criteria. Moreover, 
the number attaining all five convergence criteria peaked in the period 1998-2001, 
but thereafter declined (at least temporarily, before policy instruments were used 
to force a greater degree of convergence) thereby illustrating the difficulties in 
maintaining political willpower after the commencement of EMU and adherence 
in light of an economic slowdown. Whilst the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
was designed to reinforce the former, the latter is a consequence of the 
convergence criteria’s inherent design faults and questionable a priori 
convergence between EMU candidates. 
 
Additionally, the ability of each EU member state to participate in monetary 
union, through examining the average number of criteria met in a given year and 
by a given country, indicates that only Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland come close to satisfying the convergence 
indicators on a permanent basis; although even their record raises significant 
doubts about their long term ability to achieve the convergence criteria. Thus the 
available evidence provides little support for the ability of member states to both 
achieve, and maintain, the stipulated convergence criteria for more than 
momentary periods. To the extent that the convergence criteria satisfactorily 
indicate ‘fitness’ of entry for EMU, the failure of EU member states to 
consistently meet these criteria raises the prospect of the single currency 
becoming unsustainable in the medium- to long-term. 
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The degree of variability in the attainment of the five convergence criteria 
over the 1992-2002 period is measured by their standard deviation where 
Luxembourg was the best performing member state in this regard closely 
followed by France, Ireland, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. However, 
the more disturbing finding is the significant level of variability of countries such 
as Finland, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy where the figure exceeds either 1 or 
2 convergence criteria. Although their movement towards fuller compliance in 
more recent years offsets this, such historical instability regarding the adherence 
of the convergence criteria highlights the potentially fragile nature of the euro 
project as presently conceived. 
 
The conclusions reached from this analysis diverge significantly with the 
examination of the progress towards convergence and sustainability of the 
monetary union completed by the EU Commission (1998). Indeed, the 
Commission concluded that eleven EU member states have “achieved a high 
degree of sustainable convergence”, with the UK, Sweden and Denmark utilising 
their opt-outs from membership and only Greece deemed incompatible with 
EMU. However, its conclusion conflicts with the economic data; for example, 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden all 
possessed a government debt ratio exceeding 60% in 1999. Even assuming that 
the economic climate is favourable to reducing previous debt burdens, it is most 
improbable that Italy and Belgium will be able to meet these criteria since both 
have government debt ratios in excess of twice the convergence criteria limit.  
Indeed, their government debt share of GDP is significantly higher than that of 
Greece, although Italy and Belgium were passed as ‘fit’ for monetary union 
membership whereas Greece was initially rejected. 
 
The variance between the historical evidence that a large number of EU 
member states will not consistently meet the convergence criteria by the 
establishment of EMU, and that their participation in the monetary union has 
already been endorsed by the Commission, may indicate that the decision as to 
which countries qualify has been taken on political rather than economic grounds. 
The problem with undermining a rigorous interpretation of the convergence 
criteria is that, to the extent that they reflect necessary prerequisites for a 
sustainable EMU, failure to comply could create a potentially weakened single 
currency which will suffer from a higher degree of inherent tension than would 
otherwise have been the case. The experience of those countries that narrowly 
comply with the convergence criteria for only a minority of the period since the 
TEU was adopted, suggests that they are not permanently converged, but only 
achieve the necessary conditions in the most favourable economic circumstances. 
The implication is that, once a recession occurs, the majority of EMU participants 
will demonstrate a significant divergence from the established criteria, thereby 
increasing the potential for destabilisation at the heart of the single currency. 
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Greece: accession, growth and crisis 
In January 2000, the ECB and the Bank of Greece resumed a policy of 
exchange rate stability around the central parity, which was revised to ECU 1 = 
Drachma 340.75, reflecting some 3.5% revaluation of the currency vis-à-vis the 
euro and 2.0% above its ERM-II central rate (ECB, 2001; Anastasatos and 
Manou, 2008). It was expected that this revaluation would enter EMU at a strong 
exchange rate, while ensuring that the rate of inflation remained low in the long-
term, even if this resulted in a further decline in export competitiveness. 
Moreover, it was projected that the inflationary impact of the depreciation of the 
drachma towards its conversion rate on import prices will disappear by the end of 
2001 (ECB, 2000). 
 
Although Greece vigorously implemented policies aimed at achieving a high 
degree of sustainable economic convergence in order to meet the terms of the 
TEU, the post-2000 the Greek deficit levels have remained higher than the 3% 
level, hence the country was not fully adhering to the government deficit 
requirement under the SGP. Similarly, even though Greece did not meet the 
public debt criteria, the European Council decided that it has fulfilled most of the 
conditions for the adoption of the single currency, thus the country became the 
12
th
 member of the EMU on January 1, 2001
1
. 
 
Following Greece’s accession, the economic situation remained relatively 
positive: the rate of economic growth in Greece was significantly above the 
average growth of 2.2% recorded in the euro zone, and the rate of unemployment 
remained relatively stable, at around 10% in the same year. Meanwhile, 
consumer-price inflation in Greece was 3.6% which is significantly higher than 
the ECB target rate of 2.0% and is primarily due to the increase in petroleum 
prices over the year. On the other hand, the general government debt was between 
100-107% of GDP, hence the government’s assertion that the outstanding public 
debt would be equivalent to its target of 60% of GDP by the end of 2000, 
therefore appeared overly optimistic.  
 
Furthermore, after Greece joined the EMU, the country accumulated many 
macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities, due to easy access to international 
funds at low borrowing costs and high economic growth that lead to the real value 
of debt thus stimulating increased borrowing by the government in order to 
finance fiscal deficits which further worsened current account deficit. Thus, 
during 2003 when Greece posted GDP growth of 6%, a deficit of 7.8% on the 
                                                          
1
 In the Greek case as elsewhere, the EMU nominal convergence criteria excluded the debt to GDP 
ratio, the rate of which by the end of 2000 was over 100 percent. 
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country’s current account was recorded while a deterioration in the budget deficit 
was witnessed, breaching the 3% of GDP limit, and as a result the country was 
subjected to the Excessive Deficit Procedure, as envisaged in the framework set 
by the SGP. 
 
Having had levels of debt and deficit exceeding reference values even before 
entering the Eurozone, the European Commission issued a report in June 2004 
reviewing the problem of excessive deficits in Greece as part of the surveillance 
system of the preventive arm
2
 (Ngai, 2012). Moreover, the Commission 
emphasized that the quality of public data was unsatisfactory, noting that the EU’s 
statistical office (Eurostat) had not certified or had unilaterally amended data 
provided by the National Statistics Service of Greece since 2000
3
 (Belkin, 2010). 
Subsequent statistical revisions during 2004-07 revealed that Greece had violated 
the 3% limit in every year since 2000, with its budget deficit topping out at 8.8% 
of GDP in 2004. The Commission also noted that Greece’s gross debt had been 
above 100% of GDP since before Greece joined the euro, and that the statistical 
revisions had pushed the debt number up as well (Belkin, 2010). It is also believed 
that the deficit originated mainly from the spending side (e.g. transfers and public 
wages) and as a result, the debt to GDP ratio was already as high as 103% of GDP 
at the outset of the crisis.  
 
Meanwhile, during 2004 there was an early election in Greece in which the 
incumbent party of New Democracy won, but with a marginal majority and stayed 
in office until the end of 2000. One of the main goals of this newly elected Greek 
government was to improve the negative trend in the economy as well as to deal 
with tampering with statistics of the previous government. Fiscal policy therefore 
was procyclical, providing a stimulus to disposable income and consumption, on 
top of the impetus provided by private credit growth (Riedl, Silgoner and 
Knollmayer, 2015). Nonetheless, the achieved adjustment relied on one-off 
measures and was thus unsustainable. The combination of high economic growth, 
the persistent fiscal imbalances and the deterioration of the competiveness over 
the past decade worsened the external balance of the Greek economy, with the 
current account deficit peaking at 15.2% of the country’s GDP in 2007. The 
widening of the external imbalances happened mainly due to a growing deficit of 
trade, which reached approximately 17% of GDP in 2008 (Magoulios and 
Athianos, 2013). However, even before the crisis the openness of the Greek 
economy was low, whereby the export sector represented only 22.5% of GDP in 
                                                          
2
 Since then the country received six reports from the Commission and, Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN) regarding its fiscal situation. 
3
 European Commission, Report from the Commission: Greece, Brussels, May 19, 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/104-03/2004-05-19_el_104-3_en.pdf 
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2007 as compared to 43% in Germany. Thus, despite several years of prosperous 
economic growth, Greece started the crisis with adverse fiscal conditions. 
 
In the meantime, the Council of the European Union, based on the European 
Commission’s recommendation that the public deficit had been brought below the 
3% to GDP reference value in a sustainable way, decided that the excessive deficit 
had been corrected and brought the excessive deficit procedure to an end 
(Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2011). Nevertheless, by the end of 2007, the general 
government deficit had once more surpassed the 3% limit and a current account 
deficit ran at over 15% of GDP. Furthermore, it had become clear that the 
economy was extremely vulnerable to potential negative developments, such as a 
rise in interest rates in government borrowing or difficulties in public debt 
refinancing. It was clear that the economy lacked both the resilience and the 
institutional apparatus that would make possible appropriate policy responses to a 
sudden macroeconomic deterioration (Bank of Greece, 2014). 
 
The global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent worldwide economic 
recession had a marked negative impact on the fiscal positions of euro area 
countries. At the onset of the financial crisis, Greece mainly relied on running a 
foreign capital surplus whilst it ran both a current account and a budget deficit 
after high spending by successive governments relative to revenues raised. 
However, as the foreign capital surplus is very responsive to risk and uncertainty, 
the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis was the starting point for a sudden 
stop in capital inflow which decreased the foreign financial surplus, forcing 
Greece to lower its deficits. Since currency devaluation is not an option in a 
monetary union, Greek wages fell and GDP was reduced through internal 
devaluation resulting in a recession which increased the debt to GDP ratio.  
 
Furthermore, the Greek government’s reliance on borrowing from 
international capital markets to pay for budget deficits and trade deficits left it 
vulnerable to shift in investor confidence. If investors lost confidence in the Greek 
government’s ability or willingness to repay its debt, they would stop lending to 
the government or charge interest rates that were higher than what the Greek 
government could afford. Lack of access to new funds would make it difficult for 
the government to roll over its debt, meaning that the government would have to 
implement austerity measures quickly or risk defaulting on its debt (Belkin, 
2010). Therefore, starting from 2009, investor confidence in Greece’s ability to 
service its debt dropped significantly, hence increasing borrowing costs and raised 
the spreads on sovereign bonds. Moreover, the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009 and the related economic downturn strained Greece’s public finances, as 
government spending on programs, such as unemployment benefits, increased and 
tax revenues weakened. Greece’s reported public debt rose from 104% of GDP in 
2006 to 127% of GDP in 2009. 
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Furthermore, as most advanced economies went into deep recession and 
economic activity in emerging economies slowed down considerably, Greece 
recorded negative rates of change in GDP of 4.4 percent. Moreover, the 
Commission opened a new excessive deficit procedure in 2009 when Greece’s 
2007 deficit was reported at 7% of GDP, and that procedure is ongoing in the 
context of the existing situation (Nelson, Belkin, and Mix, 2010). Consequently, 
new revisions about Greek debt and primary deficits were made and published by 
the newly elected government led by Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou 
(PASOK). As the country’s economy started to come under closer scrutiny, credit 
rating agencies repeatedly downgraded Greece’s rating and borrowing costs from 
markets started rising: the long-term interest rates increased to 5.2% by the end of 
2009 (Economou et al., 2014). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the issue of monetary union is merely a step along a theoretical road 
of exchange rate regimes its adoption is not a decision for any country to take 
lightly given that its practical consequences in terms of both economic and 
political national sovereignty are substantial and therefore require deep analysis. 
This calculation is required by eurozone member states; however, there are 
complications in that the various cost and benefits need to be assessed within the 
context of both the potential partner country and in relation to the already 
established monetary union, or the other prospective members. Each economy is 
unique in its blend of sectoral strengths and weaknesses and comparative 
advantage, therefore the national interest will be distinctively different for each 
potential participant. Further, there is no set rule in which to weigh the relative 
merits of the arguments associated with membership of a monetary union. 
Although economic theory suggests that a monetary union will prove generally 
beneficial if the participants are sufficiently converged, it is necessary to establish 
an unambiguous, comprehensive and theoretically sound set of convergence 
criteria; however, it is questionable whether the current convergence criteria fulfil 
this role. 
 
Consequently, the sustainability of EMU in the medium- and long-term will 
partly depend upon the implementation of a fiscal policy initiative, located at the 
federal rather than national level, which is sufficiently well resourced and targeted 
to stabilise member state economies in the face of asymmetric external shocks. In 
the absence of exchange rate or monetary autonomy and with insufficient labour 
mobility and wage flexibility, individual regions may become characterised by 
persistent unemployment, low per capita income and ensuing social tension. The 
EU leadership’s priority is to prevent the single currency collapsing, but such a 
stance creates immense danger since the EU possesses only a limited volume of 
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borrowing and political will. For example, the EFSF and ESM were established 
with a capital base of €80bn to provide a lending ceiling of €500bn, but should a 
country such as Italy require a bailout, then even the combined might of the ESM 
and IMF would be severely tested. If these become exhausted, insufficient 
financial firepower may remain to prevent bank defaults when a number of 
countries decide to leave the single currency and devalue. This risk has been 
intensified by EU encouragement of cross-border loans within its jurisdiction, 
thus leaving European banks more exposed than they would otherwise have been. 
 
Although such efforts may lead to economic remedies, a potentially more 
significant outcome from the eurozone crisis is to the body-politic of the EU with 
greater long-term damage emerging through the imposition of 1930s style 
austerity policies. In terms of the flawed economics of austerity, Blyth (2013) 
provides an account of how this has reared its head at moments of crisis only to 
persistently exacerbate the situation in the overwhelming majority of cases. In the 
contemporary context of the eurozone crisis a number of studies (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1987; Persson and Svensson, 1989; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina 
and Ardagna, 2010) were the touchstone of the shift towards so-called 
expansionary fiscal consolidation; subsequently, their findings have been rebutted 
by a further series of studies (Jayadev and Konczal, 2010; Leigh et al., 2010; 
Gravelle and Hungerford, 2011; Perotti, 2011; Guajardo et al., 2011; Battini et al., 
2012; Jordà and Taylor, 2013). Overall, research on the effects of austerity on 
macroeconomic indicators remains problematic and complicated by the difficulty 
of identifying multipliers; however, the consensus has now shifted in favour of the 
latter studies refuting the applicability of fiscal consolidation. Moreover, they 
indicate that fiscal contraction prolongs the pain when an economy is weak 
compared to when the economy is strong; in other words precisely not the policy 
to pursue in times of crisis. 
 
In addition to a return to austerity-orientated economics and political 
discourse, a further aspect of the EU’s response to the eurozone crisis has 
arguably been a weakening of the bonds of social cohesion through increasing 
internal and external discrimination, together with the rising spectre of racism in 
Europe. The twin concepts of internal and external discrimination are centred on 
the notion that in contrast to EU integrationalist developments, for third country 
nationals there is a danger of Europe increasingly becoming a 'fortress', whilst 
internal discrimination occurs through the differences in the way individual 
member states treat their minority populations that are partially explicable in 
terms of their differing histories and patterns of migration. In terms of the extreme 
right in contemporary Europe the conventional view has been that their rise in 
popularity is largely explained by the individual fortunes of political parties, as 
opposed to a particular phenomenon occurring. However, evidence suggests that 
the diminution of social cohesion/rise of racism as exemplified by support for the 
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extreme right is a pan-EU phenomenon exacerbated by neoliberal deflationary 
policies as espoused by EMU and now austerity (Baimbridge et al., 1994). 
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